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Abstract
This paper investigates economies of scale (ES) in nancial intermediation as a source of
equilibrium indeterminacy. Consumption in the model can be purchased with currency and
deposits, and ES in intermediation implies that deposit costs are decreasing in aggregate
deposits. The results suggest that indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES
nor a large intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal
interest rates. Monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise
for any degree of ES, while policies targeting nominal rates eliminates indeterminacy for all
degrees of ES.
Keywords: Financial Intermediation; Economies of Scale; Equilibrium Indeterminacy;
Monetary Policy
JEL: C62, E44, E52
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1. Introduction
What are the conditions for economies of scale (ES) in nancial intermediation to de-
liver equilibrium indeterminacy? This question is motivated by the extensive literature on
indeterminacy due to increasing returns to scale in production (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer,
1994), as well as the literature on banking crises where a strategic complementarity in in-
termediation delivers multiple (steady-state) equilibria (e.g. Bryant, 1987). In contrast to
the research on the production sector, this analysis builds on empirical evidence reported
by Hughes and Mester (1998) that banks exhibit signicant scale economies.1 In contrast
to the research on banking crises, ES in intermediation is explicitly captured in an innitely
lived, representative agent economy and its potential for delivering indeterminacy is ana-
lyzed. Combining elements of both literatures results in this paper being a rst attempt
at considering intermediation as an avenue through which agentsbeliefs (or animal spirits)
contribute to economic uctuations.2
To illustrate how ES can deliver indeterminacy, suppose intermediaries possess decreasing
marginal costs with managing household deposits, and pass these costs onto depositors.
ES will distort household decisions regarding deposit and currency balances to be used
to purchase consumption. If a household believes the deposit market will be thick (thin)
and the costs to using deposits small (large), it will hold more (less) deposits resulting in
the initial belief to become self-fullled. The sunspot shocks resulting from this strategic
complementarity will inuence nominal interest rates, distort real behavior, and be welfare
reducing.
The intermediation technology described above is introduced into an otherwise standard
monetary environment where households purchase consumption with both currency and
deposits. The model follows Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) (henceforth, CF) where cash-in-
1See Berger and Mester (1999) for references both in support and in contrast to this result. More recently,
Wang (2003) and Allen and Liu (2007) have uncovered modest ES in intermediation.
2Cooper and Corbae (2002) use an OG model without capital to assess the importance of a banking
crisis on the Great Depression. Their shock results in a lower steady state, where this analysis follows the
production sector literature and considers uctuations around a unique steady state.
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advance timing allows the nominal interest rate to be interpreted as a tax (i.e. opportunity
cost) on goods purchased with currency. Deposits provide an alternative medium of ex-
change capable of circumventing this tax, but their use incurs a transaction cost. A natural
equilibrium condition in models with multiple mediums of exchange is that the marginal
cost of using each medium must be equal. Therefore, if ES inuences the cost of deposit
use, then there exists a link between the source of indeterminacy and the opportunity cost
of currency.
The results suggest that equilibrium indeterminacy does not heavily depend on the degree
of ES in the intermediary or the size of the intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and
the determination of nominal interest rates. When the monetary authority does not target
interest rates, as it would when following an endogenous (or exogenous) money growth rule,
the nominal rate is inuenced by the cost of deposit use and indeterminacy arises for any
degree of ES. When the monetary authority targets the nominal rate as it would when
following a Taylor (1993)-type rule, it targets the opportunity cost of currency (and in
equilibrium, deposits). The cost of deposit use is therefore realized and indeterminacy fails
to arise for any degree of ES. In other words, when the monetary authority determines the
cost of using deposits, it is impossible for household beliefs to become self-fullled.
These results have several implications. First, the model suggests that equilibrium in-
determinacy arising from the nancial intermediation sector is possible even though a small
fraction of assets are intermediated and intermediaries possess ES very close to zero (i.e.
constant marginal costs). This suggests that the impact of ES in intermediation might be a
signicant issue even though there has yet to be a consensus in the empirical banking liter-
ature on its existence. Second, while providing a situation where policies targeting nominal
interest rates or money growth rates are not equivalent, this analysis adds an additional
condition on subsequent research concerning the quantitative importance of this source of
indeterminacy: not only must intermediaries possess ES, but monetary policy must allow (al-
beit, unknowingly) these intermediaries to deliver indeterminacy. This suggests that there
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could be many natural experiments in history which can be used to assess the economic
signicance of this indeterminacy. For example, how much of the decline in US economic
volatility observed during the 1980s (termed the Great Moderation) was due to the monetary
authority e¤ectively eliminating sunspot shocks from the intermediation sector by switching
from a money target to an interest rate target in 1984?
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the economy and
presents propositions concerning conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy as well as a sen-
sitivity analysis. Section 3 concludes. Proofs are presented in an appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Environment
The economy consists of a large number of identical and spatially distinct locations (i.e.
islands) and a single monetary authority. Each location is populated by numerous identical
and innitely lived households, and a large number of perfectly competitive goods-producing
rms and nancial intermediaries. The only asset that can travel across locations are nom-
inal bonds issued by the monetary authority, ensuring that each location faces an identical
nominal interest rate. Since the analysis focuses on equilibrium determinacy, the environ-
ment is simplied to a deterministic economy without loss of generality. If the economy is
subject to indeterminacy, it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria.
Households
A representative household has preferences over streams of consumption (ct) and labor
time (`t) given by
1P
t=0
tU (ct; `t) ; (1)
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where  < 1 is the discount rate. Instantaneous utility is assumed to take the form: U (c; `) =
(c1    1) = (1  )  ` with   0:
Period t begins with a household holding nominal nancial wealthWt and physical capital
kt: Capital evolves according to kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it; where  denotes the depreciation rate
and it denotes investment. The nancial market opens rst, where households receive a
lump-sum currency transfer from the monetary authority (Xt) and buy and sell bonds (Bt)
which are in zero net supply (across locations) and earn a gross nominal return 1+Rt. Any
remaining nancial wealth takes the form of currency (Mt) such that
Mt = Wt +Xt  Bt: (2)
Before leaving the nancial market, households divide their capital into a deposit with an
intermediary (dt) and a direct loan to the rm (at) at gross real returns rdt and rt; respectively.
This implies the constraint kt = at + dt:
Consumption can be purchased with both currency and deposits. Currency use is gov-
erned by a cash-in-advance constraint
Ptc1t Mt; (3)
where Pt denotes the aggregate price level and c1t denotes the portion of consumption pur-
chased with currency. Deposit use implies
Ptc2t  Ptdt; (4)
where c2t (= ct   c1t) denotes the portion of consumption purchased with deposits.
It is assumed that checks clear, and interest payments and loans are simultaneously paid
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at the end of the period. The households intertemporal constraint is given by
Pt (ct + kt+1) +Wt+1  Pt
 
wt`t + rtat + r
d
t dt

+Mt + (1 +Rt)Bt; (5)
where wt is the real wage rate.
Productive Firms
Goods-producing rms combine rented capital and hired labor to produce according
to a CRS technology: f
 
kTt ; `
T
t

= kTt `
T (1 )
t ; where a superscript T denotes aggregate
quantities. Prot-maximization results in the marginal product of each input to equal its
marginal cost.
fkT
 
kTt ; `
T
t

= rt   1 +  (6)
f`T
 
kTt ; `
T
t

= wt (7)
Financial Intermediaries
An intermediary pools household deposits, creates interest-bearing checking accounts,
and rents the deposited capital to rms. It is assumed that an intermediary provides no
additional services such as loan screening or monitoring. From the perspective of a rm,
loans from intermediaries and households are perfect substitutes and therefore must share
the same rental rate (rt) : This prevents the nancial intermediary from having monopoly
power over loan supply.
In the equilibria examined in this paper, at currency and deposits will both be held.
Following Williamson (1986), for arbitrage opportunities to be absent and to guarantee
intermediaries are solvent, the following must hold in equilibrium:
rt   rdt = Rt: (8)
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This condition states that the opportunity cost of holding currency (Rt) is equal to the
opportunity cost of holding capital in the form of deposits
 
rt   rdt

. In other words, although
intermediaries might be monopoly suppliers of deposits, they are not monopoly suppliers of
liquidity because a household can choose to make all purchases with currency.
It is assumed that intermediaries have no minimum reserve requirements and lend all of
their deposits.3 The prot function of an intermediary is given by
rtd
T
t  

rdt d
T
t + C
 
dTt

; (9)
where dTt is total real deposits and C
 
dTt

denotes operating costs. If these costs are mar-
ginally decreasing, the intermediary will exhibit ES. Assuming C (Dt) =  D1+t ; ES arises
for any  2 ( 1; 0):
There is free entry into intermediation so if an intermediary receives strictly positive
prots, another intermediary can enter, o¤er a higher deposit rate and capture the entire
market. Given that competition with households for loans and the monetary authority for
liquidity results in intermediaries taking rt and rdt as given, zero prots in (9) generates the
following average-cost pricing rule:
rdt = rt    t; (10)
where  t = C (Dt) =Dt =  Dt denotes average operating costs. Zero prots ensures that
there will be no equilibrium entry or exit into the intermediation sector. Furthermore, while
suggesting that there will be only one nancial intermediary per location, competition with
other agents prevents the intermediary from exploiting pricing powers usually associated
with natural monopolies.4
3The results presented below are qualitatively unchanged if the intermediary is required to keep a mini-
mum fraction of deposits in reserves.
4Of course, one could assume informational asymmetries that would make intermediation essential and
allow deposits or loans to be priced in a monopolistically competitive fashion. However, monopolistic com-
petition would still result in intermediaries passing on some of their reduced costs (as in Williamson, 1986),
which is su¢ cient for the main points of this analysis to go through.
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The Monetary Authority
The monetary authoritys budget constraint isXt = W Tt+1 W Tt , whereW Tt+1 denotes the
currency base available at each location at the end of period t: The base evolves according to
W Tt+1 = tW
T
t where t is the gross growth rate. The analysis considers two specications of
how the monetary authority chooses t: money growth rules and interest rate rules. Under a
money growth rule, t is pinned down and the nominal interest rate is determined by market
conditions. Under an interest rate rule, t is chosen in order for the nominal interest rate to
achieve a specied target.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened as a list of prices fPt; Rt; rt; wtg and allocations fc1t; c2t;
`t; Bt; dt; Wt+1; kt+1g such that: (i) households maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), and (5);
(ii) rms maximize prots; (iii) intermediaries follow (10); (iv) all individual and aggregate
quantities are equal (e.g. kt = kTt ); (v) the markets for goods (f (kt; `t) = ct + it + C (dt)),
bonds (Bt = 0;8t), and money clear; and (vi)  t =  dt :
Household optimization is characterized by the binding conditions (3), (4) and (5), and
the Euler equations
U`t
Uct
=
wt
1 +Rt
; (11)
Uct
1 +Rt
= rt+1
Uct+1
1 +Rt+1
; (12)
Uct
1 +Rt
= 
1 +Rt+1
t+1
Uct+1
1 +Rt+1
; (13)
Rt = rt   rdt ; (14)
where t = Pt=Pt 1 is the ination rate. Equations (11) through (13) equate the costs
and benets of marginal increases in `t; kt+1; and Wt+1; respectively. Since labor income is
not available for period t consumption purchases, (11) illustrates the cash versus non-cash
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distortion and allows the nominal rate to be interpreted as a consumption tax.
Equation (14) states that the optimal composition of currency versus deposit-goods is
chosen such that the opportunity costs for using deposits
 
rt   rdt

and currency (Rt) are
equal. This condition is identical to (8) and is necessary for an interior solution to the
households problem. Substitution of (14) into the intermediarys pricing function (10) results
in
Rt =  t (15)
and states that the cost per deposit is equal to the opportunity cost per unit of currency.
Removing  t with the intermediarys cost function results in
Rt =  d

t : (16)
Equation (16) suggests that any change in marginal deposit costs must also inuence the
nominal rate (and vice-versa). Indeterminacy will therefore crucially depend on the ability
for changes in deposit balances to inuence nominal rates. Since nominal rates may be
dictated by monetary policy, indeterminacy may depend on the type of monetary policy in
use.
2.2. Equilibrium Dynamics
The baseline dynamics are assessed under two extreme versions of monetary policy.
First, monetary policy is assumed to be exogenous (t = ;8t) :5 Second, the monetary
authority follows a Taylor-type rule where the nominal rate responds to past ination,
1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t 1

!
; (17)
5A following section considers endogenous money growth rules and conrms that with the exception of
policy parameters, the results are identical to those under an exogenous rule.
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where  denotes the long-run (steady state) ination rate and (1 +R) = =. This backward-
lookingrule with ! > 1 was shown by CF to deliver equilibrium determinacy in a model
without intermediation.6
The results under these two policies are formalized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 Under exogenous monetary policy, equilibrium indeterminacy arises for any
 satisfying
max

 1; 1 +R
R
d
c

<  < 0:
Proof: See Appendix.
The proof uses (16) to substitute Rt out of the dynamic system resulting in the eigen-
value associated with ination to be dependent on . ES in the intermediary then delivers
indeterminacy as long as  satises the above condition. While leaving the discussion for
later, this condition is only restrictive when there is no interior solution and no assets are
being intermediated (i.e. d = 0).
For intuition on how indeterminacy arises in the model, consider the depositing decision
of a household when the nancial intermediary exhibits ES. Given that (10) is anticipated, a
household decides how much consumption to purchase with their present currency holdings
and how much to purchase with deposits. A strategic complementarity emerges from this
decision: the more households choose to deposit, the higher the returns to using deposits
(all else equal). Therefore, the size of the deposit market is determined in a non-cooperative
fashion by the simultaneous choices of the (identical) households. If a household believes
the size of the deposit market will be large (small) and the net returns on deposits high
(low), it will hold more (less) deposits resulting in smaller (larger) deposit costs and higher
(lower) e¤ective deposit returns. The belief is supported by intermediaries possessing ES
and becomes self-fullled.
6In addition to real indeterminacy, CF dene nominal indeterminacy as an inability to pin down equi-
librium prices. This analysis restricts attention to policies delivering both real and nominal determinacy.
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Proposition 2 If the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule
1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t 1

!
with ! > 1; equilibrium indeterminacy fails to arise for any  2 [ 1; 0):
Proof: See Appendix.
With Rt predetermined due to a predetermined ination rate, equation (16) removes 
from the dynamic system and the proof exactly follows that of CFs proposition pertaining to
determinacy under the same policy rule. Although households hold deposits in equilibrium,
determinacy is independent of  and depends solely on the monetary authoritys response
to changes in past ination (i.e. ! > 1). This suggests that even though the intermediary
may possess a large degree of ES, indeterminacy is eliminated when the monetary authority
determines the cost to using currency, and in equilibrium, deposits. With the cost of deposits
pinned down, it is not possible for belief shocks from the households to become self-fullled.
These results suggest that indeterminacy arising from the intermediary sector crucially
depends on how nominal interest rates are determined. While this is the main point of the
analysis, there are some ner details worth noting. First, when monetary policy is exogenous,
Proposition 1 states that indeterminacy is possible for rather lax conditions: (i) that some
assets be intermediated (d > 0), and (ii)  < 0: To illustrate the rst condition, under log
utility ( = 1) and R equal to 6 percent ann., a deposit-currency ratio (d=c) greater than
0:0145 makes  (1 +R)d=Rc <  1 and  can then take any value between 0 and  1. This
deposit-consumption ratio is far below the post-war US value, and suggests indeterminacy
is possible for any degree of ES without further conditions on the intermediation sector (e.g.
relative sector size, direct-intermediated loan ratios, etc.).7 Considering the debate in the
empirical literature concerning ES in the intermediation sector referenced in the introduction,
7The post-war average of Demand Deposits at Commercial Banks(series name: DEMDEPSL) divided
by Personal Consumption Expenditures(series name: PCE) is over 0.15, with a minimum of 0.029. Sources:
Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the BEA.
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small degrees of ES (i.e.  close to zero) may be di¢ cult to signicantly estimate but could
still deliver indeterminacy. Second, when monetary policy follows an endogenous interest
rate rule, the determinacy of the economy exactly mimic those of CF. In other words, an
interest rate rule with ! < 1 would deliver indeterminacy even in the absence of ES (i.e.
 > 0) because the monetary authority is accommodating changes in ination. Finally,
having  enter into the ination equation of the dynamic system indicates that although
the deposit cost  is real, indeterminacy enters through nominal channels by allowing inside
money and prices to be susceptible to belief shocks. This stands in sharp contrast to the
literature on indeterminacy from the production sector which focuses on real channels.
2.3. Sensitivity Analysis
Alternative monetary policies can be considered in order to assess the robustness of
the results. First, t can be endogenous and allowed to respond to changes in ination,
t =  (t=)
! ; or in nominal rates, t = 
 
1+Rt
1+R
!
;with elasticity !: The exogenous policy
considered previously is a special case of either rule with ! = 0: Given ! < 1, which is
the condition insuring that the policy itself is not a source on indeterminacy, the results
as well as the proofs for both rules are exactly the same as Proposition 1.8 If the nominal
rate responds to changes in deposits, indeterminacy arises for any degree of ES. Note that
although the nominal rate appears in the second rule, it is not being targeted so the intuition
under exogenous monetary policy goes through.9
To assess the results under interest rate rules, consider a rule using more than past
ination to establish the target.
1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t

!1 t 1

!2
(18)
8Although the sensitivity results are stated in this section, they are formally stated in proposition form
and proved in the appendix.
9Backward-lookingmoney growth rules result in bifurcations and are not considered (see Azariadis,
1993, ch 8).
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Although this rule implies that Rt is not entirely predetermined, the result is identical to
Proposition 2. In particular, !2 > 1 is necessary for the policy rule to not be a source of
indeterminacy, and this condition is independent of : Although the nominal rate is allowed
to respond to current ination, the result is identical to the result under a backward-looking
interest rate rule.10
3. Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to establish conditions for ES in the nancial intermediation
sector to deliver equilibrium indeterminacy in a monetary environment. While it is rea-
sonable to believe that more sophisticated models (featuring non-linear leisure preferences,
nominal rigidities, etc.) may yield additional conditions for indeterminacy to arise, if these
environments possess multiple mediums of exchange then their marginal costs of use must be
identical in equilibrium. Since this feature is central to the results presented here, it suggests
that indeterminacy will be eliminated when nominal rates are targeted in these environments
as well.
This result warrants some discussion. First, the model provides an example where interest
rate rules and money growth rules are not equivalent policies, and the choice of the policy
target may be important. Second, since the analysis identies the class of policies which
allow intermediation to deliver indeterminacy, research on the quantitative importance of this
indeterminacy must be restricted to be in this class. In other words, when is it reasonable
to believe that such (non-interest rate targeting) monetary policies were in use? For the
US, policies other than explicit interest rate rules were in use before 1979 and during the
monetary aggregate targeting experiment from 1979 to 1982 (see Meulendyke, 1989, ch 2).
For other countries, particularly small-open economies, policies occasionally focus on global
variables such as exchange rates rather than domestic interest rates. It is encouraging that
10Purely current-lookingor forward-lookinginterest rate rules deliver (real and / or nominal) indeter-
minacy for all parameterizations and are not considered (see CF).
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these candidates are associated with relatively large degrees of observed economic volatility.
For example, the US economy experienced a large decline in economic volatility (referred
to as the Great Moderation) around the same time the Federal Reserve began targeting
nominal interest rates (see Blanchard and Simon, 2001). Since the results presented here
suggest that the adoption of a nominal interest rate target may have removed intermediation
as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy, then the reduction in economic volatility might be
partly attributable to the removal of these sunspot shocks. It would therefore be of interest
to assess the quantitative impact of indeterminacy arising from the intermediation sector
on more sophisticated environments, as well as assessing the quantitative importance using
these candidate episodes. These issues are presently being explored.
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Appendix
Proposition 1 Under exogenous monetary policy, equilibrium indeterminacy arises for any
 satisfying
max

 1; 1 +R
R
d
c

<  < 1:
Proof. Let xt = `t=kt: The rst order conditions, normalized by the currency base, are
given by
xt
1   = 
Pt
Pt+1
(1 +Rt+1)
xt+1
1  ;
xt
1   = 

x1 t+1 + 1  
 xt+1
1  ;
kt+1 = ktx
1 
t + (1  ) kt   c1t   c2t    tdt;
Uct
1 +Rt
=
xt
1  
P 1t = c1t; dt = c2t; Rt =  t =  d

t :
Substituting c1t; c2t; dt; andRt out of the system results in the rst three equations comprising
the log-linearized system:
264 1   (1  ) (1  ) 0
  R
1+R
A1
R
1+R
A2   1
375
264 x^t+1
P^t+1
375 =
264  0
  1
375
264 x^t
P^t
375
where
A1 =



c2
c
+
R
 (1 +R)
 1
and A2 =
c1
c

c2
c
+
R
 (1 +R)
 1
;
and the resource constraint k^t+1 = H

x^t; P^t; k^t

: The resource constraint can be uncoupled
from the remaining system and delivers one eigenvalue e1 = [1   (1  ) (1  )] = > 1:
The roots of the remaining system are given by
e2 = = [1   (1  ) (1  )] < 1; and e3 =

1  R
1 +R
A1
 1
:
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Since there is only one predetermined variable to the system, indeterminacy of the system
depends on e3 lying inside the unit circle or if A1 < 0: Economies of scale implies  < 0:
Therefore, A1 > 0 with d = c2 implies   (1+R)R dc < :
Proposition 2 If the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule
1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t 1

!
with ! > 1; equilibrium indeterminacy fails to arise for any  2 ( 1; 0) :
Proof. It is easier for the rst order conditions to be cast in real terms and given by
xt
1   = 
(1 +Rt+1)
t+1
xt+1
1  ;
xt
1   = 

x1 t+1 + 1  
 xt+1
1  ;
kt+1 = ktx
1 
t + (1  ) kt   c1t   c2t    tdt;
Uct
1 +Rt
=
xt
1  
dt = c2t; Rt =  t =  d

t ; 1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t 1

!
:
Following the steps as in Proposition 1, the log-linearized system is given by
266664
1   (1  ) (1  ) 0 0
  1 0
0 0 1
377775
266664
x^t+1
^t+1
^t
377775 =
266664
 0 0
  ! 0
0 1 0
377775
266664
x^t
^t
^t 1
377775
and the resource constraint k^t+1 = H

x^t; P^t; k^t

: The resource constraint can again be un-
coupled from the remaining system and delivers one eigenvalue e1 = [1   (1  ) (1  )] = >
1: The roots of the remaining system are given by
e2 = = [1   (1  ) (1  )] < 1; e3 = 0 < 1; and e4 = !:
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Since there are two predetermined variable to the system, determinacy of the system depends
on e4 lying outside the unit circle or ! > 1: This condition is independent of :
Proposition 3 If the monetary authority follows an endogenous money growth rule
t = 

1 +Rt
1 +R
!
with ! < 1, equilibrium indeterminacy arises for any  satisfying
max

 1; 1 +R
R
d
c

<  < 0:
Proof. Following the proof to Proposition 1, the log-linearized system is given by
264 1   (1  ) (1  ) 0
  (1 !)R
1+R
A1
(1 !)R
1+R
A2   1
375
264 x^t+1
P^t+1
375 =
264  0
  1
375
264 x^t
P^t
375
where
A1 =



c2
c
+
R
 (1 +R)
 1
and A2 =
c1
c

c2
c
+
R
 (1 +R)
 1
;
and the resource constraint k^t+1 = H

x^t; P^t; k^t

: The resource constraint again delivers one
eigenvalue e1 = [1   (1  ) (1  )] = > 1: The roots of the remaining system are given
by
e2 = = [1   (1  ) (1  )] < 1; and e3 =

1  (1  !) R
1 +R
A1
 1
:
Indeterminacy of the system depends on e3 lying inside the unit circle or if (1  !) A1 <
0: Economies of scale implies  < 0: Therefore, A1 > 0 and ! < 1 with d = c2 implies
  (1+R)
R
d
c
< :
Proposition 4 If the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule
1 +Rt = (1 +R)
t

!1 t 1

!2
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with !2 > 1; equilibrium indeterminacy fails to arise for any  2 ( 1; 0) :
Proof. Following the proof to Proposition 2, the log-linearized system is given by
266664
1   (1  ) (1  ) 0 0
 !1   1 0
0 0 1
377775
266664
x^t+1
^t+1
^t
377775 =
266664
 0 0
  !2 0
0 1 0
377775
266664
x^t
^t
^t 1
377775
and the resource constraint k^t+1 = H

x^t; P^t; k^t

: The resource constraint again delivers one
eigenvalue e1 = [1   (1  ) (1  )] = > 1: The roots of the remaining system are given
by
e2 = = [1   (1  ) (1  )] < 1; e3 = 0 < 1; and e4 = !2:
Since there are two predetermined variable to the system, determinacy of the system depends
on e4 lying outside the unit circle or !2 > 1: As in Proposition 2, this condition is independent
of :
19
References
[1] Allen J. J., and Liu, Y., E¢ ciency and Economies of Scale of Large Canadian Banks,
Canadian Journal of Economics 40(1) (February 2007), 225-244.
[2] Azariadis, C. (1993), Intertemporal Macroeconomics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
[3] Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R.E.A., Indeterminacy and Increasing Return,Journal of
Economic Theory 63 (June 1994), 19-41.
[4] Berger, A., and Mester, L., What Explains the Dramatic Changes in Cost and Prot
Performances of the U.S. Banking Industry,Working Paper #1999-13, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (1999).
[5] Blanchard, O. and Simon J., The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (2001), 135-64.
[6] Bryant, J., The Paradox of Thrift, Liquidity Preference and Animal Spirits,
Econometrica 55 (1987), 1231-1236.
[7] Carlstrom, C., and Fuerst, T., Real Indeterminacy in Monetary Models with Nominal
Interest Rate Distortions,Review of Economic Dynamics 4 (2001), 767-89.
[8] Cooper, R. and Corbae, D., Financial Collapse: A Lesson from the Great Depression,
Journal of Economic Theory 107(2) (December 2002), 159-190.
[9] Hughes, J. and Mester, L., Bank Capitalization and Cost: Evidence of Scale Economies
in Risk Management and Signaling,Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (1998), 314-
325.
[10] Meulendyke, A-M., U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets: New York: Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (1989).
20
[11] Taylor, J.B., Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39 (December 1993), 195-214.
[12] Wang, J. C., Productivity and Economies of Scale in the Production of Bank Service
Value Added,Working Paper No. 03-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (2003).
[13] Williamson, S. D., Increasing Returns to Scale in Financial Intermediation and the
Non-Neutrality of Government Policy, Review of Economic Studies 53(5) (October
1986), 863-875.
21
